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RESPONSIVE ARGUMENT

I.

RESPONDENT REPEATS THE MISTAKE OF THE TRIAL COURT AND
DISTRICT COURT BY RELYING ON PRIOR OPINIONS FOR HIS
ARGUMENTS RATHER THAN ON THE FACTS PRESENTED TO THE
COURT.
Appellant's (Ms. Walton) main argument in her appellate brief was the contention that

the trial judge did not consider the evidence on the record and instead relied on his past
impressions of Ms. Walton to make his judgment. Appellant argued that although there was
evidence on the record to contradict these past impressions, the judge simply repeated his rulings
from prior hearings. The Respondent (Mr. Gotch) falls into the same habit and does not cite to
the evidence on the record but merely repeats the judge's rulings, ignoring the evidence on the
record that is contrary to those rulings.
Since the issue on appeal is whether or not the trial judge abused his discretion by
ignoring the evidence on the record, it would behoove us to compare the evidence to the judge's
findings.
The judge found that that although the grades were poor, their deportment had improved
and both children were receiving appropriate support and guidance from Mr. Gotch. The
evidence, however, showed that the girls grades were, in fact, falling and that the homework
sheets that Mr. Gotch was supposed to be helping with were not being turned in or they were
being turned in blank many times. Appellant demonstrated this on the record by submitting
sheet after sheet of homework and school reports that came back as "O" and "F". Ms. Walton
also attached a homework summary to her appeal to the district court that demonstrated a lack of
any progress in the performance of the children at school. See Reply Brief for Appellant, March
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8, 2016, attached Homework Summary. The judge ignored this evidence and simply fell back on
his prior ruling that stated that Mr. Gotch was providing proper support.
The judge found that Ms. Walton failed to talk to teachers about her concerns prior to
filing the petition. This is completely contrary to the evidence on the record which showed that
Ms. Walton had repeated and continuous positive contact with the girls' teachers. Both Kendra
McMillan and Molly Pannkuk, testified that Ms. Walton came in weekly and sometimes twice a
week to review the grades and that she regularly conferred with the teachers about the girls'
progress. See Transcript ofDay One ofHearing ofMotion to Modify. p. 162, L. 21-25; p. 163,
L. 1-9. The trial judge was present to hear all this testimony but chose to ignore it and make up

facts that fit his opinion of Ms. Walton, claiming that she had failed to talk to the teachers.
Finally, the judge ruled that only a short period of time had elapsed since the previous
hearing. The evidence showed that this "short period of time" was three full quarters of school,
almost the entire school year with absolutely no improvement in the grades. While this may not
be a large amount of time in the court system, this is a huge amount of time in terms of the
children's education and future.

II.

RESPONDENT'S EXPERT WITNESS TESTIMONY CANNOT BE
CONSIDERED BECAUSE HER TESTIMONY IS NOT BASED ON ANY
SCIENTIFIC METHOD AND BECAUSE SHE HAS NO PERSONAL
KNOWLEDGE OF THE MATTERS SHE TESTIFIED TO.

Contrary to Mr. Gotch's assertion, Ms. Walton has objected to Ms. Masom's testimony from
the very beginning. Ms. Walton attorney first raised the issue by calling into question Ms.
Masom's testimony at the trial level. Ms. Masom testified that it was her clinical impression that
was being encouraged to fail by her mother and that Abby's poor performance was due to
her attempts to please her mother. Transcript ofDay Two ofHearing on Motion to Modify,
5

pg.345, L. 12-21

Ms. Walton's attorney established, through cross-examination, that Ms.

Masom was basing her "clinical impression" on a gut feeling and had never talked to

or so

much as laid eyes on her. Transcript ofDay Two ofHearing on Motion to Modify, pg. 343, L.
15-24

Her opinion was based solely on interaction with Ms. Walton in co-parenting counseling

sessions. Transcript ofDay Two ofHearing on Motion to Modify, pg.333, L. 10-23
The issue was raised again during oral argument in front of Judge Stegner of Latah County
District Court when Ms. Walton's attorney argued that Judge Robinson should not have relied on
the testimony of Ms. Masom because offher lack of training in child psychology and her lack of
personal experience with

Now Ms. Walton raises the issue again and by Respondent own

arguments, Ms. Masom is shown to be disqualified as an expert witness or a lay witness.
A. Ms. Masom relied on a gut feeling. not on any scientific. peer-reviewed method to
draw her conclusions and cannot be considered as an expert witness
Expert witnesses are held to a very high standard and are required to back up their
opinions with research, evidence of the effectiveness of their analysis methods, and showing that
their methods have widespread acceptance in the scientific community. Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals. Inc.. 509 U.S. 579 (1993)

The purpose of these standards is to prevent an expert from misleading a jury with junk
science or simply swaying their opinions with his credentials. An expert must be able to prove
that his findings are accurate for them to be of any use to the trier of fact, either judge or jury.
Ms. Masom presumed to give an expert opinion on Abby's state of mind, stating that she
believed that

was trying to fail in order to please Ms. Walton. This opinion was not based

on any examination of

herself but was just a suspicion based on Ms. Masom's interactions

with Ms. Walton. Ms. Masom herself described it as a "gut feeling" "not based on facts" and
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that she had "no idea what happened outside of co-parenting sessions". There was no scientific
analysis, no method that could be clinically tested, no peer-review of her methods, nothing. Ms.
Masom may be an expert in co-parenting counseling but not in child psychology and even a child
psychologist could not make an evidentiary finding about a child's state of mind and motivation
without ever having seen or spoken with the child. Because Ms. Masom's testimony basically
took the form of an untested hunch, her testimony should not have been considered as expert
evidence and the reliance of the trial judge and district court appellate judge on this evidence
constitutes reversible error.
B. Ms. Masom cannot testify as a lay witness to the state of mind of a child when she
has never spoken to or met the child and lacks any personal knowledge of the
matter
Ms. Masom is also not qualified to testify as a lay witness because she had no personal
knowledge of the matter. The Respondent cites the case of State v. Ehrlick as support for his
contention that Ms. Masom testimony was admissible. In that case, a woman joined in a search
for a neighbor's missing child. The child was supposedly attending a birthday party in the
apartment complex. Based her knowledge as a long-time resident of the apartment complex and
her conversations with several other children, the court allowed her to testify as a lay witness that
she did not believe that there actually was a birthday party.

State v. Ehrlick, 158 Idaho 900

(2006)
The important distinction between State v. Ehrlick and the facts of the present case is that
the witness was allowed to testify because she had personal knowledge of the apartment complex
and had personally spoken with several other witnesses. Her testimony was limited to what she
personally had knowledge of and it did not rely on any scientific knowledge or special training.
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Ms. Masom is much more similar to the doctor in State v, Johnson. The doctor was a
general practitioner who was called to the stand to testify to his belief that certain children had
been sexually abused. His belief was based on his professional opinion formed by reviewing the
medical histories of the children that were supplied to him by third parties. The Court ruled that
this was inadmissible. The Court held that because the doctor was a general practitioner and had
no special training with regards to sexual abuse or children, he could not testify as an expert.
Furthermore, the doctor could not testify as a lay witness because he had no personal knowledge
of the matter based on his own perceptions. His testimony was based on his opinion after
reviewing the children's medical history but he never personally examined the children or spoke
to them. Finally, the doctor's testimony was inadmissible because of his profession. The Court
ruled that the unsubstantiated testimony of a doctor would carry a large amount of weight with a
jury because of his profession and therefore created a much greater risk of unfair prejudice than
another witness might. On these grounds, the Court refused to admit the testimony. State v.

Johnson. 119 Idaho 852 (Ct. App. 1991)
Ms. Masom's situation is much the same. Her "clinical impression" was not based on
months of personal knowledge or discussions with the children, like the woman in Ehrlick but
was based on information she gleaned from discussions with third parties, like the doctor from
Johnson. Ms. Masom herself admitted that she didn't know what happened outside of the
counseling sessions with Mr. Gotch and Ms. Walton but that she had a gut feeling that
motivated to fail. Ms. Masom never spoke with
had examined

never consulted a child psychologist who

and had never so much as laid eyes on

Ms. Masom's only

information came from her interactions with Ms. Walton and unfounded suspicions.
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was

Like the doctor, Ms. Masom may have experience working with children in the past but
this does not qualify her as an expert without some showing that she has had special training in
child psychology so as to understand Abby's emotional and mental state. The doctor in Johnson
had undoubtedly worked with children before in his general practice but the Court required that
he have some specialized knowledge with regards to children or sexual abuse before he could
testify as an expert. Similarly, Ms. Masom has undoubtedly worked with children before in her
counseling sessions but she has not had any special training in regards to child psychology that
would allow her to testify to the inner motivations and emotions of a child she has never met.
Ms. Masom's years of training and experience as a counselor actually tells against
admitting her testimony. Just like the doctor in Johnson, she is a professional and her opinion
carries the danger of unfairly prejudicing the trier of fact and swaying his opinion based on her
credentials, not the reliability of the evidence. The trial court and the district court should not
have admitted her testimony and their failure to exclude the evidence constitutes reversible error.

III.

APPELLANT'S CASE WAS REASONABLY BROUGHT BECAUSE
APPELLANT HAD A LEGITMATE ISSUE OF FACT IN THE FAILING
GRADES OF HER CHILDREN.
Ultimately, the main issue in this case is whether or not Ms. Walton's case was

reasonably brought. Under Idaho Code §12-121, attorney's fees can only be awarded to the
prevailing party when the court finds, "from the facts presented to it, that the case was
brought frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation." Idaho Code §12-121
The Idaho Supreme Court has stated that fees cannot be awarded if there is any
legitimate, triable issue of fact. McGrew v. McGrew, 139 Idaho 551, 82 P .3d 833, (2003).
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This is true even if the losing party has asserted other claims that are indeed frivolous or
without foundation. Thus, if a losing party can show just one legitimate issue of triable fact,
attorney's fees cannot be awarded under Idaho Code § 12-121. This is a low threshold for a
losing party to cross and it is meant to allow most claims to be litigated without the fear of
crushing legal fees if the claim should lose. To allow attorney's fees to all prevailing parties
would have the unjust effect of preventing all but the most airtight cases from being brought
for fear of the consequences of losing. The Court in McGrew recognized this and ruled that
fees could only be awarded where the losing claim is clearly frivolous and there is not one
legitimate, triable issue of fact. It is not necessary that the issue be likely to win, only that it
be legitimate and based in facts. Id.
In the case presently on appeal, Ms. Walton had a legitimate triable issue of fact in the
form of her children's falling academics. Ms. Walton had seen nothing but failing grades
from both her daughters and had expressed her concern to the girls' teachers. Those teachers
had assured her that the girls' deportment was improving and that Mr. Gotch was helping
them with their homework. However, Ms. Walton continued to see failing grades and the
homework sheets, that Mr. Gotch was supposedly helping with, were being turned in
incomplete or even blank and were often not returned at all. Most of the sheets did not have
a parent signature, as was common for the homework sheets. Ms. Walton could not see any
signs that Mr. Gotch was fulfilling his parental duty to help with the children's education and
the girls had been failing for three full quarters, almost a full school year. It was at this point
that Ms. Walton finally filed her Motion to Modify, seeing no other way to intervene to help
her children.
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The legitimate, triable issue of fact was simply this: Was Mr. Gotch fulfilling his duties
to assist in the girls' education and could the girls thrive in his custody? Even if the ultimate
decision of the court was to deny the motion, that doesn't render this issue frivolous. Based
on the girls' performance and the lack of any sign of meaningful improvement, Ms. Walton
had a legitimate issue of triable fact and that alone should have prevented any award of
attorney's fees at the conclusion of the case. But instead, the trial judge ruled based his
ruling on his personal opinion of Ms. Walton and ignored the evidence, as has been discussed
earlier in this brief. This constitutes an abuse of discretion and is a reversible error.

CONCLUSION AND PRAYER FOR RELIEF
Based on the fact that the trial court and the district appellate court ignored the evidence
on the record and relied on prior opinions of Ms. Walton, Ms. Walton respectfully asks this
court to reverse the decision of the trial court and deny the award of attorney's fees.
Based on the fact that the trial court and the district appellate court relied on inadmissible
expert witness testimony, Ms. Walton respectfully asks this court to reverse the decision of
the trial court and deny the award of attorney fees.
In the alternative, based on the fact that the trial court and district appellate court relied
on inadmissible expert witness testimony, Ms. Walton respectfully asks this court to reverse
the decision of the trial court to admit the evidence and to remand the case to the magistrate
court for proceedings consistent with this ruling.
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Respectfully submitted this

'1th_ day of February, 2017.
Paul Hanes, ISB# 10011
Signing on behalf of
Gregory R. Rauch
Attorney for Appellant
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Jennifer Ewers
Attorney at Law
609 S. Washington St.
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By:.~~~~~~~
Gregory R. Rauch
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